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Adult humans show sophisticated metacognitive abilities, including the ability to monitor uncertainty. Unfortunately, most
measures of uncertainty monitoring are limited to use with adults due to their general complexity and dependence on explicit
verbalization. However, recent research with nonhuman animals has successfully developed measures of uncertainty monitoring
that are simple and do not require explicit verbalization. e purpose of this study was to investigate metacognition in young
children using uncertainty monitoring tests developed for nonhumans. Children judged whether stimuli were more pink or
blue—stimuli nearest the pink-bluemidpoint were themost uncertain and themost diﬃcult to classify. Children also had an option
to acknowledge diﬃculty and gain the necessary information for correct classi�cation. As predicted, children most oen asked for
help on the most diﬃcult stimuli. is result con�rms that some metacognitive abilities appear early in cognitive development.
e tasks of animal metacognition research clearly have substantial utility for exploring the early developmental roots of human
metacognition.
1. Introduction
Humans oen have to make decisions in situations in which
information is incomplete, or in situations in which they
do not know the best course of action. In the former case,
they may request more information. In the latter case, they
may choose not to choose. at is, they may decline to
make a response because they know they do not know the
answer. is ability, to know when one knows an answer
and when one does not, is called metacognition, and it is
sometimes described as “thinking about thinking” [1]. e
metacognition shown by adult humans may be intimately
connected to important aspects of re�ective mind, including
cognitive control, self-awareness, and consciousness. It is one
of humans’ most sophisticated cognitive abilities. erefore,
understanding the earliest developmental roots of metacog-
nition is a fundamental goal of cognitive developmental
research.
At present, the evidence suggests that metacognition
appears to emerge quite late in cognitive development [2, 3].
erefore, its full manifestation could even possibly be a
uniquely adult human capacity. Children typically do not
show many metacognitive abilities until late preschool ages
[4–8]. For example, consider a task in which children are
asked to predict their performance.ird grade children have
been reported as more pro�cient than �rst-grade children
when predicting which picture-label matches they would be
able to recognize [9]. �oung children tend to be overcon�dent
relative to older children [3].ey also confusemetacognitive
estimates with actual memory contents [10]. But, this does
not mean that young children have no way of evaluating
information. ey seem to be able to tell good information
from bad information [11]. Children as young as 2.5 years
of age also can indicate when they do or do not know the
meaning of a word (e.g., [12]), and children as young as
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�ve years of age report higher con�dence levels for correct
responses than for incorrect ones (e.g., [13]).
So, we may not yet know the full story regarding young
children’s metacognitive competence. It may be that younger
children struggle to showmetacognitive competence because
of the nature of the tasks that are used to test them. Reliance
on verbal, introspective, and declarative and language-based
procedures may explain why younger children fail to show
metacognitive performances, and this is not the same as a
genuine lack of the underlying capacity (see [8, 14, 15], for
extensive discussion of this issue). Some researchers argue
that metacognition may be available in a form that allows
for implicit access to knowledge states before it is in a form
that is well diﬀerentiated and verbalizable. Young children
may behave in ways that re�ect metacognition before they
are able to report verbally what it is they are doing. In
fact, the use of observational methodologies has shown
that young children may provide more nonverbal indicators
of metacognition (such as eye gaze shiing, gestures, and
pauses) than previously thought (e.g., [16]).
Accordingly, the best way to assess metacognition in
young children could be through tasks that are purely
behavioral, nondeclarative, and as language free as possi-
ble. Although few such measures currently exist for young
children, such tasks have been developed in response to the
present sharp interest in cross-species studies of metacog-
nition. Metacognition tasks for nonhuman animals (here-
aer, animals) are de�nitionally purely behavioral, non-
declarative, and language free. erefore, tests developed
for use with animals could have a high value for assessing
metacognition in young children (see [14]).
Comparative research indicates that some species may be
capable ofmetacognitive processes, particularly themetacog-
nitive process of uncertainty monitoring. In some cases,
animals appear to deal with uncertainty adaptively by seeking
information or by refusing to make a choice when the
risk of error is high (e.g., [17–21]). e problem in this
research areas has been that it is diﬃcult to explain the
task rules to animals and impossible to elicit anything like
the verbal reports of uncertainty that humans can give. So
instead, researchers have designed behavioral tasks that have
two components. First, researchers make some trials easy
but some trials diﬃcult. Second, researchers give animals
a response apart from the task’s primary discrimination
responses that lets them decline to complete any trials they
chose. is uncertainty response lets animals manage their
uncertainty and declare it behaviorally and observably, if they
can, because they should recognize diﬃcult trials as risky
and error-causing and decline those trials proactively and
adaptively.
For example, when monkeys are trained to classify
stimuli that lie along a psychophysical continuum (e.g.,
discriminating brightnesses, line lengths, or circle sizes), their
performance is poorest for the most diﬃcult stimuli near
the discrimination’s breakpoint. When monkeys are given
a third response that allows them to decline the current
trial without receiving reward or punishment for a primary
response, they can selectively use this response on exactly
those trials for which they are at greatest risk of making
an incorrect primary response (e.g., [19, 22–24]). Although
there is debate about the appropriate interpretive level for
these data with animals (e.g., [25–30]), the data re�ect clearly
that animals avoid exactly those trials on which they aremost
likely to make errors. To date, an uncertainty response has
been included in tests of psychophysical discrimination in
the visual, auditory, and temporal domains [19, 23, 24, 31],
in tests of list memory, item memory, and spatial memory
[21, 32, 33], in tests of two-choice discrimination learning
[34], and in tasks involving judgments of quantity [22] and
judgments of sameness and diﬀerence [35].
ere is research interest in uncertainty monitoring and
metacognition in developmental psychology and education
more broadly, and great interest in improving those capacities
in children [36]. e tasks designed for use with animals can
be adapted easily for use with human populations including
very young human children [37, 38], whereas tests used to
assess adult human metacognition may not be suitable for
young children. Tasks designed for animals may oﬀer new
avenues for successfully eliciting uncertainty responding, or
they may operate as a scaﬀolding step toward the more
verbal and explicit forms of metacognition that are desired
in humans. However, these kinds of tasks have only rarely
been adapted for use with young children. In one case,
3.5 year-old children performed a paired-associate memory
task and were given the option to skip trials if they wanted
when given the recognition memory test [14]. Accuracy for
accepted items was signi�cantly higher than for skipped
items on a subsequent memory task that included all items,
and this suggested that children may have had implicit
access to their own knowledge states by this age, even if
explicit forms of metacognition could not yet be demon-
strated [14]. No test using psychophysical discriminations
with an attendant uncertainty response has yet been given
to children at this age, and if children also succeeded on
that kind of task, this would strengthen the argument that
young children have access to at least an implicit form of
metacognition.
us, we presented young children with a task based
on the principles of the uncertainty monitoring paradigm
used with nonhuman animals. Although the task is inspired
by animal research, and it is true that children do not
have to make explicit verbal reports, it still requires some
degree of verbal instruction. erefore, the task is not yet
language free, at least as used in the present experiment.
We created a simple discrimination task and an engaging
story to structure that task for children. is allowed us not
only to assess the perceptual diﬃculties that children faced
in the discrimination, but also to assess the extent to which
they would use an uncertainly response that allowed them
to opt out of the discrimination and instead gain outside
information about how to classify the stimulus in question.
Our prediction was that children might show data patterns
in this task consistent with those shown by animals and
adult humans in closely analogous tasks. Speci�cally, we
predicted children would use the uncertainty response more
oen for diﬃcult items in comparison to less diﬃcult items,
thus demonstrating adaptive uncertainty monitoring during
psychophysical judgments.
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F 1: A screen shot of the task.e present is at top center and is shaded in one of 20 shades from bright pink to dark blue.e boymouse
at le is supposed to receive blue presents and the girl mouse is to receive pink presents. e shrugging character (the Helper) at bottom is
the uncertainty response stimulus, and when presents are given to her they are then routed to the correct mouse.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants. Twenty two children (MN = 54.5 months;
SD = 6.8 months) were tested. Children were recruited
through a university database of available participants, and
all children who came into the laboratory completed this test
as part of a larger battery of cognitive tests performed using
computerized or manual tests. ree children participated in
a pilot version of the task to re�ne the methodology. eir
data were excluded from all analyses because of subsequent
changes made to the procedure. e research was conducted
with approval from the Georgia State University Institutional
Review Board. Informed consent was provided by the parents
or legal guardians of the children.
2.2. Design and Procedure. e task was programmed in
Visual Basic and presented on an IBM-compatible laptop
computer so that it could be taken to the testing site for
children. Key presses were used to record the responses of
the children, with small icons mirroring the large response
options on the screen aﬃxed to the relevant keys on the
keyboard.
Figure 1 shows the uncertainty-monitoring task. On each
trial, a stimulus appeared in the screen’s top center. It was
the digital image of a gi wrapped in a color ranging in 20
steps from the purest blue color to the purest pink color.
Half the stimuli were ob�ectively classi�ed as blue and half
as pink. e levels closest to the blue-pink breakpoint of
the discrimination were expected to be more diﬃcult to
classify. A male mouse character—to be the recipient of bluer
gis—was shown at the top le (see Figure 1). A female
mouse character—to be the recipient of pinker gis—was
shown at the top right.ese two stimuli represented the blue
and pink responses in the discrimination. At bottom center
was an image of the “helper” shrugging her shoulders. is
stimulus represented the uncertainty response.
In the cover story for the task, the help of the child was
enlisted to distribute presents to the two mice. e speci�c
instructions given to children were as follows.
“Today we’re going to help our two mice friends
who are having a birthday party (point or indicate
two mice images). Your job is to make sure each
mouse gets the right presents. You need to give the
blue presents to the Boy Mouse by pressing this
button (point/indicate the bluemouse button) and
the pink presents to the GirlMouse by pressing this
button (point/indicate the pink mouse button). It
is very important to do your best because when
you give the presents to the right mouse a happy
face appears and the mouse is happy, but if the
wrong mouse gets the present, a sad face will
appear because themouse is sad. If you don’t know
if the present is pink or blue or who to give it
to, don’t worry, you can give it to the Helper by
pressing this button and she’ll �nd out who the
present belongs to. Each time you give 5 presents
away, you will earn a sticker to put on your sticker
page! If you don’t want to push the buttons, tell me
who gets the presents and I will do it for you. Are
you ready? Let’s start handing out the presents!”
All trials then were initiated by the experimenter with a
key press on the keyboard. is was necessary to ensure that
the children were ready to attend to the screen and to the
trial. Children made responses by key press. e key press
to give a present to the male or female mouse caused that
present to scroll over to that mouse. e key press to give the
present to the helper sent the present scrolling to the helper,
at which point it was redirected and scrolled to the correct
mouse automatically. Correct responses made by the child
produced a smiley face in the center of the screen and a happy
chuckling sound. Incorrect responses produced an unhappy
face on the screen and a beeping sound. Presents redirected
by the helper went to the correct mouse, but there was no
auditory or visual feedback beyond that. Children were given
as long as they needed tomake a response.is was necessary
because they showed variable levels of motor skill in pressing
the keys, and so a time limit would have precludedmany valid
choice responses. Additionally, if needed, the children could
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F 2: Overall performance (total % trials correct) in assigning
the presents to the two mice and the overall percentage of trials at
each level for which the children gave the present �rst to the Helper
(the uncertainty response).
tell the examiner their response, and then the examinerwould
push the corresponding key for them.
It is important to note that the stickers were given to
ensure that children enjoyed continuing to play the game.
eir noncontingent delivery regarding game performance
ensured that we were not rewarding use of the uncertainty
response, and in fact stickers could have been given imme-
diately aer incorrect primary responses if those responses
were in the �h position of a given trial block. It is also
important to note that the uncertainty response was available
on every trial. Some paradigms that are used with nonhuman
animals intersperse trials with or without the uncertainty
response that is supposed to re�ectmetacognition (e.g., [32]),
with the goal being to see if the subject is more accurate on
trials where they could have chosen to skip the test but did
not compared to trials where they were forced to take the
test. However, not all paradigms use this method (see [28]
for overview), and this is not a feature in the experiments we
have given to monkeys, so we used a consistent methodology
with the children.
At the beginning of each session, only the two easiest trial
levels were presented until the child was correct on 7 of the
last 10 trials in classifying these stimuli. ese trials were
excluded from analyses. Subsequently, all possible levels were
presented, with each trial a random selection of one of the 20
levels. Children worked for one session for as long as they
were willing to engage the task. e data from two children
were excluded due to early discontinuation because they only
completed 21 and 18 trials, respectively. All other children
completed between 59 and 79 trials (MN = 75.7 trials). In all,
the data from 17 children were included for analysis.
3. Results
Figure 2 shows the performance of the children. e �gure
shows all trials combined across children to provide the full
data set. Analyses of variance were used to assess the relation
between stimulus level and the use of the primary responses
(boy or girlmouse) and the uncertainty response (the helper).
For both curves (percent trials correct and percent trials in
whichhelpwas requested), the best �t functionwas quadratic:
percent correct F(2, 17) = 9.16, 𝑃𝑃 𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃; percent help
requested F(2, 17) = 24.70, 𝑃𝑃 𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Both curves showed
a clear trough or peak near the center of the distribution. In
addition, there was a signi�cant negative correlation between
the percentage of trials correct and the percentage of trials
on which help was requested, r(18) = −.49, 𝑃𝑃 𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.
is indicated that children were more likely to ask for help
on trials for which they were at greater risk of making a
classi�cation error when they attempted to distribute the
present to either the boy or girl mouse. It should be noted
that 15 of the 17 children made suﬃciently large numbers of
uncertainty responses (10% of trials or more) to make clear
that theywerewilling and able to ask for help. One childmade
only a single uncertainty response, and one child never used
that response.
4. Discussion
In this experiment, we presented young children with a
psychophysical discrimination task that included an uncer-
tainty response. e primary discrimination (blue versus
pink) was made suﬃciently diﬃcult that there were some
trial levels on which children would likely make mistakes.
Crucially, childrenweremost likely to ask for help—declining
to make the classi�cation themselves—on those trial levels.
e children’s behavioral responses were somewhat similar
to adult humans and some nonhuman primate species given
similar tests (see [20, 32]). However, performance was not as
optimal as usually seenwith adults andmonkeys. Uncertainty
responses weremade rather broadly across approximately the
middle third of the color range. Children asked for help on a
broad range of trials (not just the most diﬃcult ones), and
there is certainly room for improvement.
us, children evidently experienced uncertainty, mon-
itored that uncertainty, and they responded to that uncer-
tainty adaptively and appropriately using the uncertainty
response. ese results from a perceptual, psychophysical
task complement those fromamemory-monitoring task [14].
ey support the hypothesis that children younger than �ve
years of age can and sometimes do monitor what they do
and do not know. Both lines of research demonstrate that the
paradigms originally developed for assessing metacognition
in animals have parallel utility for researchwith younghuman
children. Indeed, those paradigms may be very well suited
for tracing the earliest roots of metacognitive abilities during
cognitive development, particularly if those paradigms can
be validated as re�ecting metacognitive states in animals (for
this ongoing debate, see [26–30]). It has been a signi�cant
problem in developmental research that children have oen
been given uncertainty monitoring tasks that are novel,
diﬃcult, abstract, and that require an explicit verbal response
[39].ese tasks may underestimate children’s true metacog-
nitive capacities.e present task—familiar, simple, concrete,
nonverbal, and perceptual—may provide another pro�le for
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revealing uncertainty monitoring in very young children
who may be able to enact metacognition procedurally long
before they can declare metacognition explicitly. Any child
who can respond within a cognitive task might be asked
to demonstrate his or her uncertainty-monitoring ability,
limited only by the experimenter’s ability to frame an intuitive
task and a brief/engaging procedure. And so the question
remains as to just how young children can be and still show
evidence of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. We
hope that more research will be forthcoming in this area.
Procedural metacognition paradigms also have potential
for testing metacognition—or fostering metacognition—in
populations of autistic, language delayed, or educationally
challenged populations. ese children regularly fail to
sustain and generalize metacognitive activities, and, worse,
seem impervious to the training manipulations and remedial
programs that seek to foster those capacities, even if those
eﬀorts are explicit and extensive [40–43]. To our mind, these
interventions have sometimes erred by focusing onmetacog-
nition within the complex cognitive tasks of school (e.g.,
reading comprehension). ey also sometimes rely on an
explicit, declarative ink Aloud approach (e.g., [44]). is
training approach could back�re given the use of complex
and verbal tasks, their resource requirements, or a failure of
readiness in children to engage in a sophisticated, regulatory
dialogue with themselves. A useful complementary approach
might be to use paradigms like that used in the present
research to give metacognitive strategies like uncertainty
monitoring an initial, behavioral, procedural foothold within
cognitive functioning. en, one might bootstrap on the
behavioral strategies to broaden their application toward
educational activities or gradually help the child bring those
strategies into focal consciousness and make them part of
explicit, declarative cognition.
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